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On Multilingualism and the International Legal 
Process 
 
GLEIDER I HERNÁNDEZ* 
INTRODUCTION 
Substantial effort has been dedicated to understanding the different cultural and intellectual 
traditions that, for better or for worse, have infused international law with its contemporary 
character, and much faith is placed in the capacity for legal texts precisely to reflect human 
conceptual intention. Yet, the relationship between language and international law, unlike in 
many of the social sciences and humanities, has rarely formed the subject of thorough study.
1
 
Instead, most research focuses on how legal language can channel norms and values into 
human behaviour and on problems such as the plurilingual interpretation of treaties.
2
  
                                                 
* DPhil candidate (Wadham College, Oxford), LLM (Leiden), BCL & LLB (McGill); Associate Legal 
Officer & Law Clerk to Vice-President Peter Tomka and Judge Bruno Simma, International Court of Justice. It 
goes without saying that the present piece is a purely personal reflection of the author‘s views and does not in 
any way represent those of the Court. All other standard disclaimers apply. 
1
 There are exceptions, such as the discussion of language as a method of argumentation and rhetoric, 
most famously symbolised in Martti Koskenniemi‘s work (eg M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the 
Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, reissue 2005)); see also M 
Koskenniemi, ‗International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal‘ (2005) 16 European Journal of 
International Law 113. See also P Allott, ‗Language, Method and the Nature of International Law‘ (1971) 45 
British Yearbook of International Law 79. Some other materials which deal with the issue somewhat have been 
published in Societé française pour le droit international (ed), International Law and Diversity of Legal Cultures 
(Paris, Pedone, 2008), in the context of a joint conference between the French and German Societies of 
international law in Nice, and the International Law as Language for International Relations: Proceedings of 
the United Nations Congress on Public International Law (13-17 March 1995) (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 1996). 
2
 See, eg M Sibert, Traité du droit international public, Vol II (Paris, Dalloz, 1951) 320; J Hardy, ‗The 
Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals‘ (1961) 37 British Yearbook of 
International Law 72; A McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961) 432–35; S Rosenne, 
The problématique is as follows. There are murmurs of dissatisfaction in the corridors 
of New York, Geneva and The Hague to the effect that current linguistic arrangements no 
longer reflect aspirations for a less Euro-centric, more universal international law. Under this 
argument, the widespread use of the English language in economic, political and institutional 
circles has divorced this language from its native speakers and allowed it to become a truly 
auxiliary international language. Thus, the use of French, historically the second international 
working language, would be reduced or altogether eliminated. This change would catalyse 
increased access for individuals who already struggle to master one foreign language, as the 
perceived ‗barrier‘ of having to learn French would be eliminated. Already, that language has 
begun to be informally marginalised in favour of a unilingual working environment.  
One can also see this trend in the international academy, where more and more 
published material is in English alone.
3
 Two small anecdotes might be of interest here. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
‗The Meaning of ―Authentic Text‖ in Modern Treaty Law‘ in R Bernhardt, WK Geck, G Jaenicke and H 
Steinberger (eds), Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte: Festschrift 
für Hermann Mosler (Berlin, Springer Verlag, 1983) 759. A similar focus exists with regard to the drafting of 
multilateral treaties: see, eg International Law Commission ‗Preparation of Multilingual Treaties: Memorandum 
by the Secretariat‘ UN Doc A/CN 4/187, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol II (New York, 
United Nations, 1966) 104–11. As for the work of international organisations, see, eg UN Secretary General, 
Multilingualism: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/54/478 (New York, United Nations, 1999); E 
Kudryavtsev, and L-D Ouedraogo, Implementation of Multilingualism in the United Nations System 
JIU/REP/2002/11 (Geneva, United Nations, 2003); and CE King, AS Bryntsev and FD Sohn, The Implications 
of Additional Languages in the United Nations System JIU/REP/77/5, UN Doc A/32/237 (Geneva, United 
Nations, 1977). Cf P Reuter, Droit international public (Paris, PUF, 1968), 25–26: ‗[E]n l‘absence d‘une langue 
internationale, les règles internationales sont formulées dans une langue nationale; les termes de celle-ci sont 
justiciables d‘un double lexique, l‘un vers le droit national et il y a alors renvoi, l‘autre vers le droit 
international. Le partage entre les deux cas n‘est pas toujours effectué une fois pour toutes au départ; on voit 
souvent par un «développement» du droit international celui-ci édifier progressivement ses notions propres et 
les substituer à celles du droit national.‘ 
3
 An attempt to counter this was made in producing a French-language commentary to the UN Charter. 
As its editors explained, their commentary ‗comble une lacune car il constitue le premier commentaire 
systématique issu de l‘école de pensée française … Nous disposions jusqu‘à présent des analyses en langue 
anglaise.‘ Avant-propos de JP Cot and A Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies, 3rd edn (Paris, Economica, 2005) 
ix; see also J Perez de Cuellar, préface in ibid, v. A notable exception to this tendency is O Corten and P Klein 
(eds), Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités ― Commentaire article par article (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 
    
European Journal of International Law, originally publishing in both French and English, 
explains: ‗the decision to publish exclusively in English is based on the fact that it enables us 
to reach the widest possible readership, in view of the ever-growing number of Europeans 
and others for whom English is the principal second language.‘4 More recently, the French 
and German Societies of International Law published the proceedings of a colloquium jointly 
held in Nice, which focused on cultural diversity and international law. The francophone 




This phenomenon has significant repercussions for international law, however. It 
cannot be said that the impact of any change to the current linguistic settlement would not be 
limited to increasing the universalism of international law; it would in fact engender several 
concerns, three of which merit mention. 
First, language does not merely reflect patterns of usage based on economic, political, 
or social trends, especially in a discipline with the universalist aspirations of international 
law. The language used by an individual carries the full weight of national traditions, of 
intellectual histories, and of differing cultural interpretations. Moreover, the interpretation of 
legal texts rests on epistemic and semantic factors, which requires the translation of a legal 
idea into language.
6
 Sometimes the drafting of the legislative or judicial text rests upon the 
verbalisation of legal concepts that previously had no linguistic expression. Although there is 
a careful drafting process whereby differing viewpoints are reconciled, international legal 
processes do not begin and end with the creation of law, but rather, with its interpretation, 
and it is here where an entirely different facet of the complex relationship between languages 
                                                                                                                                                        
2006), which came out in French first. However, an English version had just been finalised by Oxford 




 At that conference where the presentation leading to this study was delivered, 51 of the 59 panellists 
presented in English; eight presented in French. 
6
 R MacDonald, ‗Legal Bilingualism‘, (1997) 42 McGill Law Journal 119, 147. MacDonald‘s writing 
specifically relates to the Canadian legal framework. 
and international law come to the fore. International law, as a forum for the meeting of people 
from all corners of the globe, must accommodate all of these various phenomena.
7
 
Second, specifically with regard to francophone legal thought, it has formed an 
integral part of the development of international law and structured around a civil law 
tradition shared with much of the globe. To eliminate any and all use of French would 
gradually divorce international law from an essential part of its heritage. This is not nostalgia: 
much like the transition from the Arabic script to the Latin alphabet precluded younger 
generations of Turkish-speakers from reading the work of their progenitors without 
translation, so the elimination of French from international legal discourse constitutes a shift, 
the consequences of which are already being felt. Official marginalisation would only 
accelerate this tendency.  
Third, it behoves international society carefully to consider the loss of the pluralist 
safeguard which multiple languages provide. Multilingualism reduces the temptation of many 
domestic lawyers to transpose domestic legal principles from their own national legal system. 
Thus, the substitution or addition of international languages alongside English and French, 
such as Spanish, Arabic or Chinese, has been suggested. However, much like adding 
additional members to the Security Council, substitution or addition raise a whole series of 
issues, which obfuscate the problems with the contemporary arrangement: instead of 
increasing access to the international legal process to as many participants as possible, it 
elevates only certain groups and in fact increases the hurdles for others. This reality has the 
opposite effect of any intended reform, as the challenge remains to re-conceptualise existing 
structures so as to make them more democratic, as opposed to simply updating international 
law to better reflect contemporary power structures. 
International law, by its very nature, requires the interaction of people educated in 
different legal traditions, hence the importance of language in that framework. The 
interfacing of these legal traditions,
8
 coupled with the differences in perception of 
                                                 
7
 T Kleinlein, ‗The Language of Public International Law‘ in Societé française pour le droit international 
(ed), International Law and Diversity of Legal Cultures (Paris, Pedone, 2008) 199, provides an exhaustive 
survey of some of the major approaches to law and linguistic theory. 
8
 By ‗legal culture‘, a helpful definition is proffered by AJ Arnaud (ed), Dictionnaire encyclopédique de 
théorie et de sociologie du droit, 2nd edn (Paris, LGDJ, 1993) 141: ‗les valeurs et les attitudes qui lient le 
    
international law and the role of law more generally, makes an important contribution to 
debates concerning the role and function of international law. For this reason, this study will 
focus on a relatively narrow aspect of the field, namely the languages of international 
adjudication and legislation, and, when pertinent, the question of languages in the 
international adjudicative process. It is here that treaty interpretation, as a matter of law and 
not as a matter of obligations, takes place; it is here that a disproportionate share of the 
development of the law occurs; and it is here that the specific question of how legal cultures 
transpose their principles and approaches to the international legal plane arises. This study 
should therefore be read purely as a response to the movement towards English as a lingua 
franca of international law. 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A brief history on the emergence of diplomatic languages is in order. As is well known, Latin 
was the original diplomatic language in the West, even used orally during the Congress of 
Westphalia, although by that point French had made inroads and was the second language for 
oral communication.
9
 By the Congress of Nijmegen,  
[L]‘on s‘aperçut du progrès que la langue française avait fait dans les pays étrangers, car il n‘y 
avait point de maison d‘ambassadeurs où elle ne fut presque aussi commune que leur langue 
naturelle. … pendant tout le cours des négociations de la paix, il ne parut presque que des 
écritures françaises, les étrangers aimant mieux s‘expliquer en français dans leurs mémoires 
publics que d‘écrire dans une langue moins usitée que le français.10 
The language of diplomacy had shifted earlier than the language of treaties, which until the 
eighteenth century remained—with some exceptions—Latin, when French became 
                                                                                                                                                        
système dans un ensemble, et qui déterminent la place du système juridique dans la culture de la société 
considérée comme un tout.‘  
9
 See generally JB Scott, Le français: langue diplomatique moderne (Paris, Pedone, 1934); R Jennings 
and A Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edn (Longman, London 1992) vol I, 1054–55; see also 
A Leriche, ‗Les langues diplomatiques à l‘Organisation des Nations Unies‘ (1953) 31 Revue de droit 
international de sciences diplomatiques et politiques 45, 45. 
10
 V Williams, ‗Les méthodes de travail de la diplomatie‘, (1924) 4 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de 
Droit International 225, 262. 
ascendant.
11
 This was an important shift for international law, from the use of a language 
which enjoyed no connection with a contemporary society towards a language very much 
attached to a contemporary society (the country of France, as well as, to a certain extent, the 
upper classes of European society). 
The Versailles Conference and the Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919 
The shattering of that temporary French linguistic hegemony over international relations 
came with the Treaty of Versailles, drafted in two ‗equally authentic languages‘, English and 
French, and with the emergence of English as a co-official language of the League of 
Nations. The question was discussed during the two sessions of 15 January 1919,
12
 and only 
after long debates about the rank and prestige of the two languages could it be agreed upon 
that both versions would have equal status.
13
 For the English language, it was a breakthrough 
of sorts to attain the same level of equality as French in the Covenant of the League, which 
was the first constitutive instrument of a world-wide international organisation. 
 Pichon, Foreign Minister of France, had suggested French as the sole official 
language of the Versailles Conference, stressing the need for a common language for all, 
which could meet the conditions of ‗logique, de clarté et de précision nécessair[e] et 
couramment intelligible pour toutes les parties‘.14 Lloyd George, of Great Britain, opposed 
this request, not because of any intrinsic problem with the French language itself, but because 
the proportion of the world‘s population which spoke English required that it be given equal 
                                                 
11
 Leriche, ‗Les langues diplomatiques‘ (n 9), 46. See, eg Treaty of Utrecht, 1715 (Latin); Treaty of 
Rastatt, 1716 (French); Treaty of Vienna, 1736 (French); Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748 (French); Final Act of 
the Congress of Vienna, 1815 (French). For the latter two documents, an express reservation was entered to the 
effect that the use of French for those treaties was not a valid precedent for the future of French as a diplomatic 
language, although that particular phrase was not found in subsequent treaties. 
12
 See US Department of State, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Papers relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States (Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1943) vol III (15 January 1919), 
553–61.  
13
 M Hilf, ‗Article 111‘, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd edn 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 1379, 1380. 
14
 US Department of State, The Paris Peace Conference (n 12), 553–61. 
    
rank with French.
15
 Discussions ended fruitlessly, and in fact the Versailles Conference ended 
up opening bilingually, with delegates expressing themselves in English and French. By way 
of a decision of the Supreme Council (Great Britain, France, the United States and Italy), and 
with no consultation of the plenary Conference, Article 440 of the Treaty of Versailles 
stipulated that both English and French versions were considered equally authentic. 
James Brown Scott vehemently criticised the Versailles Conference as ‗la Conférence 
des Ignorants à Paris, en 1919‘ for its use of both English and French,16 and lauded the 
Conference leading to the French-only Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 as an end to the ‗petit 
interrègne de l‘ignorance … le français recommence sa mission intellectuelle.‘17 
Nevertheless, it was evident that the end of the First World War had led to the abandonment 
of French as the sole international legal language. In the inter-war period, treaty practice 
fragmented further, with an emerging trend for states to conclude bipartite treaties in their 




The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1922 
                                                 
15
 See ibid 554. He invoked the population of the United States (100 million at the time) and the 
population of India (over 300 million at the time); the latter were said to ‗all understand‘ the language. He 
invoked the examples of Canada and South Africa as jurisdictions with two official languages to demonstrate 
that it was indeed feasible. 
16
 Scott, Le français (n 9), 319, 139. Scott makes an unusual argument, that the use of French as a 
diplomatic language had become so entrenched in the period leading up to 1919 that its use had acquired the 
status of a customary norm, ibid 13. This is surely untenable: the opinio juris for this norm was lacking, given 
the repeated invocation of the article denying the use of French any precedential value, such as that contained in 
the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna. See also Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law (n 9), 
1054, where it is stated that the choice of French prior to the 1919 Peace Conferences was a ‗usage of diplomacy 




 MO Hudson, ‗Languages Used in Treaties‘, (1932) 26 American Journal of International Law 368, 
370–72. See also H Roumiguière, Le français dans les relations internationales (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1926); S Gaselee, The Language of Diplomacy (Cambridge, Bowes & Bowes, 1939). 
The first initiatives in international dispute settlement were flexible and granted considerable 
deference to states.
19
 It was with the emergence of a permanent standing court where the 
question of a common language for judges and parties became an issue. At the Tenth Session 
of the Council of the League, where the question of a permanent Court was discussed,
20
 Lord 
Balfour explained the reasoning for having both languages in the following terms:  
English and French corresponded with two great legal traditions, one of which was founded 
on Roman law and the other upon the English Common Law … A great part of the world to-
day employed the English language or made use of English in its foreign relations.
21
  
This suggestion was ignored by the 1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists. After a brief 
flirtation with the idea that the language of the Court be tied to its seat,
22
 the Committee 
proposed in its draft Article 37 for the Statute of the Permanent Court, in conformity with the 
‗Five-Power Plan‘23 that its official language should be French, while also citing the 
importance of a common language of communication: 
[T]he permanence of the language must be an outward sign of the permanence of the Court. It 
would be absurd to allow each of 15 to 20 judges to express himself in a different language. It 
                                                 
19
 Both the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences conducted their proceedings in French: see Scott, Le 
français (n 9) 112, and both the resulting Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 
1899 and the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1907, reprinted in S 
Rosenne, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and International Arbitration: Reports and 
Documents (The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2001), provide that the authoritative text of the Convention is the 
French version. They differ in how the parties may use language in their arbitrations: Art 38 of the 1899 
Convention provides that the tribunal decides on the choice of languages to be used by itself and to be 
authorised for use before it, whilst Art 52 of the 1907 Convention provides that the compromis between the 
parties defines, if there is occasion, the language it will use and the languages the employment of which shall be 
authorised for use before the Tribunals. 
20
 League of Nations, Procès-verbal of the 10th Session of the Council, League of Nations Doc 20/29/16 
(Brussels, 20–28 October 1920), meeting of 27 October 1920, Annexes 118a–18b. 
21
 League of Nations, Documents Concerning the Action Taken by the Council of the League of Nations 
under Article 14 of the Covenant and the Adoption by the Assembly of the Statute of the Permanent Court 
(Geneva, 1921) 42. 
22
 Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee (The Hague, Van 
Langenhuysen Brothers, 1920), 732: Bevilaqua proposed that ‗the official language of the Court shall be that of 
the town in which it is situated‘. 
23
 The proposal for a unilingual court was adopted unanimously, ibid 666. Only one of the Five Neutral 
Powers (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) has French as an official language. 
    
would be impossible to allow parties to come before the judges and use a language that they, 
the judges, did not understand. A Court composed of all the nations of the World would thus 
become a Court of all tongues.
24
 
The work of the Committee was almost exclusively in French, as can be seen in the preface to 
the PCIJ procès-verbaux: ‗As all the members of the Committee, with the exception of Mr. 
Elihu Root, spoke in the French language, the English text of the procès-verbaux is to be 
looked upon as a translation, except in so far as concerns the speeches and remarks of Mr. 
Root.‘25 However, before the League Council, Lord Balfour forcefully objected to this 
proposed unilingualism:  
I do not think that this, quite apart from the merits of the case, could be accepted until 
America joined the League, and had an opportunity of officially expressing her opinion on the 
subject. Apart from American opinion, it has to be observed that the Treaty of Versailles puts 
the two languages on an equality; and that in every instrument issuing out of the Treaty of 
Versailles this equality is maintained. The League of Nations itself carries on its business in 
French and English; and the English is not regarded as a mere translation of the French, but is 
treated as of equal authority. It would seem unfortunate to make an exception in respect to the 
Permanent Court; and I have no doubt that my Government would regard any such exception 
with the greatest disfavour.
26
  
Viscount Ishii of Japan supported this view.
27
 Upon the moment of the Council‘s vote on the 
official languages of the Court, the bilingual proposal of Mr Caclamanos was retained, with 
Mr Bourgeois (France) abstaining.
28
 
 The Treaty of Versailles and the drafting of the PCIJ Statute heralded a new period 
for international relations, where English and French were to co-exist. The substantial 
                                                 
24
 ibid 99. The 1907 Court of Arbitral Justice project had left the question of language open. 
25
 ibid at Préface, iv. 
26
 Note on the Permanent Court of International Justice submitted by Mr Balfour to the Council of the 
League of Nations, Brussels, October 1920, contained in League Documents (n 21), 39; League of Nations 
Documents, Official Records of the First Assembly, Committees, vol I, 512.  
27
 League, Documents, ibid 42; League Council, 10th session, 20–21. When this proposal was adopted, it 
was stipulated that, to avoid problems of linguistic concordance, the Court should specify which linguistic 
version would be authoritative, ibid 44–45. 
28
 MO Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice (1920–1942) (New York, Garland 
Publishing, 1972) 196. A proposal by Spain that a language expressly consented to by both parties should be 
accepted in a given case was rejected for the reason that it would be unfair to demand that judges master more 
than the two official languages: see League of Nations Documents, Official Records of the First Assembly, 
Commission Sessions, 305–306, 367. 
development of international law by the Permanent Court is notable in this regard, as it 
struggled to maintain independence from either language group. To the extent that its 
institutional framework was retained for the present International Court, one can say that its 
experience was a success; however, outside the framework of international adjudication, 
there was a significant change in how international relations were to be conducted after the 
Second World War. 
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL MULTILINGUALISM 
The United Nations and Multilingualism 
The San Francisco Conference also engendered vigorous debate as to the future working and 
official languages of the new organisation.
29
 The French delegate proposed that English and 
French should be made the two official languages on a ‗base de complète égalité‘ for the 
entirety of the Conference, thereby highlighting the ‗traditional‘ role of French as a language 
of diplomacy and one of the ‗grandes langues de la civilisation‘. The Chinese delegates 
advocated that, in the interest of time, English be the sole language of the Conference; 
conversely, the Honduran delegate declared that if French were given the status of working 
language, the same status should be accorded to Spanish. A compromise was suggested by 
the Canadian delegate, relating the experience of Canada‘s House of Commons, where 
delegates could speak in either official language, with bilingual transcripts then issued.
30
  
The impasse was resolved by the Soviet representative, who suggested that Chinese, 
English, French, Russian, and Spanish be made the official languages (in contradistinction 
with the working languages, English and French) of the United Nations. This compromise led 
                                                 
29
 See generally United Nations Information Organisations, Documents of the United Nations Conference 
on International Organisation Doc 1 (English) G/1 (1945) vol XXVII, DC/4, 42 et seq (26 April 1945). 
30
 Since the San Francisco Conference, the Canadian legal order has progressively moved towards full 
legal bilingualism, with most new federal legislation drafted in two original language versions, and bilingual 
courts and administrative agencies predominant: MacDonald, Legal Bilingualism (n 6), 127 lists a vast body of 
literature which focuses on the question of legal bilingualism in Canada. Furthermore, its legislative protection 
is uncontested: s 133 of the Constitution Act 1867, (the ‗British North America Act‘) (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3; 
the Official Languages Act (Canada), RSC 1985, c 31 (4th Supp); and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada), being Sch B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) 1982, c 11. 
    
to Article 111, which did not specify that any languages were to be ‗official‘, but designated 
the versions of the Charter in those languages as equally authentic. While a historical 
memory, distinction between the UN official and working languages is extremely important. 
Although documents were translated into the official languages, the idea that French and 
English would be the only ‗working languages‘, thus maintaining their duopoly on 
international discourse, soon proved to be intolerable. A successful campaign by Latin 
American states led to the adoption of Spanish as a third working language in 1948;
 31
 by 
1973, Russian, Chinese, and Arabic had been added to the list, thereby obliterating the 
distinction between official and working languages and changing the nature of the debate. 
What is most interesting is that the Charter is viewed as a juridical whole in those 
languages, and its interpretation never simply ignores the other official-language versions of 
the text but favours a multilingual approach.
32
 Yet, although the United Nations officially has 
six working languages, and the six UN languages appear to be used consistently in the 
drafting of multilateral treaties, the overwhelming use of English (and to a lesser extent 
French) has been noted within the organisation itself,
33
 even though the six UN languages 
appear to be used consistently in the drafting of multilateral treaties.
34
 
It is true that, especially in treaty interpretation, the ‗equally authentic‘ versions do 
not give priority to any particular language: the United Nations Charter, which was 
negotiated primarily in English and French, due to technical problems and the lack of 
simultaneous translation, assigns no particular importance to those two languages as the 
                                                 
31
 Proposal for the Adoption of Spanish as One of the Working Languages of the General Assembly, 
UNGA Res 247 (III) (7 December 1948). 
32
 Hilf, ‗Article 111‘ (n 13), 1380–81; but cf Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392, 405–06, where 
only the English and French-language versions of the Charter were considered by the Court. 
33
 See UN Secretary General, Multilingualism (n 2).  
34
 See, eg Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998), 2187 UNTS 90, Art 128; 
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property (2 December 2004), UN 
Doc A/59/508 (not yet in force), Art 33; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (9 May 
1992), 1171 UNTS 107, 31.  
‗working languages‘ of the San Francisco Conference.35 Moreover, multilingual treaty 
drafting has not necessarily affected the dominance of English in the Organisation‘s work; it 
has been claimed that 90 per cent of the UN Secretariat‘s work is in English.36 What is really 
at issue is not so much which languages are meant to dominate, but the manner in which 
working languages reinforce a culture, a framework of legal reasoning, and the transposition 
of legal norms from the national to the international—and the process whereby that is 
realised, as that transposition is not merely of a concept, but of a message. In that regard, it is 
instructive to analyse the interpretation of the Charter versus the interpretation of the ICJ 
Statute in this regard. 
Multilingualism and International Adjudication/Dispute Settlement 
Expanding the official languages of what became the International Court of Justice was 
controversial, and revealed the ideas and major debates underlying the use of language at the 
United Nations. Preliminary discussions of the Committee of Jurists hosted by the American 
Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius Jr, were held exclusively in English,
37
 and Green 
Hackworth‘s original proposals called for the Committee to work exclusively in English, ‗in 
order to expedite the Committee‘s work‘.38 The French delegate, Jules Basdevant, requested 
                                                 
35
 S Jaschek, ‗Deutsch als Sprache der Vereinten Nationen‘, (1977) 25 Vereinte Nationen 18. 
36
 See eg J Rios, ‗Les langues du droit international, risque ou avantage?‘ in Societé française pour le 
droit international (ed), International Law and Diversity of Legal Cultures (Paris, Pedone, 2008) 209 
[hereinafter ‗Rios, ‗Les langues du droit international‘‘], 213, who claims that up to 90% of the work published 
by the Secretariat is in English. Cf with the practice of the European Union, where, despite some 20-odd official 
languages and three working languages (English, French and German), up to 68% of all its work is conducted in 
English. In 2008, the GA declared the Official Year of Languages: UN Doc A/61/L 56; see also GA Res 50/11, 
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Zealand, UN Doc A/50/PV 49 (2 November 1995) 9. See also UN Doc A/RES/59/309 (22 June 2005). 
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 UNCIO Documents (n 29) vol XIV, 25–40. 
38
 ibid 53–54. This might have been justified by the fact that on the following day, the US State 
Department delegates had to take the train to San Francisco to attend that Conference. 
    
that French remain as a working language of the Committee, on the basis that the PCIJ 
Statute, drafted in both languages, would be the basis of the new Court‘s Statute; his 
proposal, ‗eu égard à la forme spéciale [sic] des statuts‘, was unanimously approved by the 
Committee, especially as the Statute of the Permanent Court was adopted as the working 
document for the proposed Court.
39
 Much of the Committee‘s work was done in both 
languages, and in particular, given that the Court‘s Statute was to be authentic in both 
languages, much of the work focused on the harmonisation of the texts.
40
 This bilingual 
drafting process arguably improved the precision and clarity of the draft;
41
 what it certainly 
did was oblige a reconciliation by using the two languages which were the most commonly 
understood by all members of the Committee; because neither of the languages was 
completely familiar to all delegates, that bilingual process also encouraged the abstraction of 
the text from a particular mindset or a specific national legal tradition.
42
 
During the San Francisco Conference, there was no longer any question that French 
and English would be represented as official languages of the Court; rather, debate centred 
upon whether they would maintain their duopoly. Roberto Córdova of Mexico proposed the 
addition of Spanish as the third official language, which was roundly criticised.
43
 The Soviets 
worried that it would pave the way for new demands; the Greek delegate, Mr Spiropoulos, 
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 M Kohen, ‗Article 39‘ in A Zimmerman, C Tomuschat and K Oellers-Frahm (eds), The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice: A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 837, 842. 
expressed his preference for one official language, but as two were already established, there 
should be no increase or addition. Mr Córdova duly did not insist on his proposal,
44
 although 
Ecuador formally proposed its inclusion.
45
 In an interesting proposal, Sánchez de Bustamante 
of Cuba proposed two separate chambers for the Court, with one headquartered in Havana 
and having four official languages: Spanish, English, Portuguese, and French.
46
 That 
arrangement ultimately also failed, in favour of preserving the two historical languages, an 
arrangement maintained to the present day.
47
 Kohen‘s appraisal of the situation is succinct 
and briefly touches upon some of the major questions: 
The choice of two languages instead of one for a Court of such an international character — 
being as it is, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations — must also be commended. 
The fact that those languages are French and English and not others is justified on the basis of 
tradition, their use as international languages and their recognition as representatives of two 
different linguistic groups. It was also a wise decision not to recognize other languages used 
within the UN system as official languages of the Court. This would have required extensive 




The approach ultimately adopted by the drafters of the ICJ Statute has broadly been followed 
by other major international courts, tribunals, and dispute-settlement bodies. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Rules of Procedure explicitly designate English and 
French as their working languages.
49
 Conversely, the Rome Statute of the International 
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ICTY works almost exclusively in English; the ICTR, in both languages. 
    
Criminal Court (ICC) provides that English and French are the working languages of that 
institution,
50
 despite several efforts to make Spanish or other official languages of the UN its 
working languages as well.
51
 Of the major international judicial/arbitral bodies, only the 
World Trade Organization‘s dispute-settlement mechanism includes Spanish also as a 
working language,
52





UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF ‘OFFICIAL LANGUAGES’ 
The Normative Aspects of Language 
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speaking contracting parties, that the Spanish language be introduced on a progressive basis: see WTO, 
Analytical Index, (n 52), 915–16. 1961 saw simultaneous interpretation from Spanish into English and French 
during plenary meetings, and the beginning of translation of official documents into Spanish. The use of Spanish 
grew until 1983, at which point Spanish had attained the same status as English and French within GATT 
negotiations. The status of Spanish has been preserved for the WTO.  
The influence of the official languages of international law is profound, in that it also 
privileges the transfer of concepts and ideas from municipal legal orders into international 
law. Where the laws, cases, and scholarly texts in international law are primarily in two 
languages, they employ the vocabulary and with it, the ideas channelled into international law 
through those two languages. Thus, because of this ‗vehicular‘ status, the transfer of ideas 
from francophone and anglophone legal orders (especially, France, the United Kingdom and 
the United States) into international law is accelerated. Moreover, the linguistic proficiency 
of native speakers of those languages leads to their over-representation in international law-
making bodies, especially amongst lawyers, judges, academics and international civil 
servants. With that representation also comes the infusion of ideas from within these 
institutions: languages become the ‗voie d‘accès aux concepts et normes qu‘il[s] 
véhicule[nt]‘.54 
For these reasons, the choice of language to employ in legal instruments and even in 
adjudicatory proceedings has a profound influence on the development of that law: these go 
far beyond problems of interpretation and precision, but goes straight into the heart of legal 
analysis. To understand legal bilingualism as mere ‗textual duality‘,55 for example, does 
violence to the concept, as it presumes that all law can be fully expressed through language, 
and that language itself can act as universal discourse.
56
 Furthermore, using two languages in 
tandem adds a new level of precision and clarity even in the original language. This is part of 
a constant process of reconciliation between both languages in an attempt to transform each 
official text into its own contribution to the whole, rather than as a mere translation from a 
primus inter partes. This process also arguably allows those select language versions to shed 
their tendency to adapt to a national legal tradition,
57
 which would mitigate some of the 
problems of using living languages for international legal discourse. 
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Theories of Language and Communication 
Language is inherently a tool for the communication of ideas and concepts. Already between 
two individuals, it is a challenge to employ the correct terms for the expression of such 
concepts—in many ways, all communication is the translation of thought into language.58 
This also applies to legal language, which harbours its own particularised vocabulary and 
idioms. This problem is magnified in international legal circles, where the interaction 
between states requires also the interaction between these individual vocabularies. Some 
common ground must be chosen, yet it is difficult to speak those ideas in our native tongue, 
much less translate them on the international plane. That problem of translation goes well 
beyond linguistic concordance; it is rooted in a problem of vocabulary: 
[L]e même terme peut être pris dans un sens différent en droit international et dans un droit 
constitutionnel déterminé. … Cette situation peut engendrer certaines confusions et l‘idéal 
serait d‘inventer, à l‘usage du droit international, un vocabulaire propre. Mais cette voie qui a 
été suivie (par exemple en inventant sur le plan international des termes nouveaux et neutres 
comme ‗acceptation‘) ne peut garantir la séparation des deux vocabulaires, car au bout d‘un 
certain temps, les règles nationales peuvent recourir à ce même vocabulaire en le déformant.
59
 
It is true that legal culture in this regard depends not on ontological differences between legal 
orders, but instead on intellectual constructions; a common national legal culture springs 
from a shared history, intellectual heritage and cognitive structures more than on any inherent 




Thus, as imperfect as shared communications are within a legal culture, there is a 
commonality which can be built upon. This imperfection grows in multi-cultural 
communities. Ideas, even under the best auspices, are not fully translatable into spoken or 
written; reliable multilingual accords are therefore even more difficult to reach, even when 
removing the problem of translation. The connotative aspects of language entail that words 
carry implied meanings, often associated with our cultural or national settings.  
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 D Jutras, ‗Énoncer l‘indicible: Le droit entre langues et traditions‘, (2000) 52 Revue internationale de 
droit comparé 781, 788. 
 Another theoretical point warranting consideration is the dependence of words on the 
larger questions of language itself—terminology only has meaning if it is interpreted in a 
context, as words themselves are not isolated entities. Their meaning depends on their 
relationship with the linguistic system as a whole, and it is the linguistic system behind a 
language which determines the value of a word and its place in a vocabulary. This argument 
is not only about lexicon or grammatical structure, but also about the philosophical, 
historical, scientific, and political contexts: words often contain unstated valuations or even 
encapsulate an entire theory: one need only invoke words such ‗normativity‘, ‗dialectic‘ and 
‗essentialism‘, to understand clearly that words carry with them cultural and contextual 
associations going well beyond a plain definition of the words themselves. 
Why Multilingualism over Unilingualism? 
The value of multilingualism (or even bilingualism) far outweighs that of unilingualism for 
this reason. For all the comforts of being able to express oneself in one‘s own language, 
linguistic pluralism is important to the very process of communication within international 
affairs. The use of several equally authentic languages, both in the drafting as well as 
interpretive processes, ensures that one of the players, or a group of players, is denied the 
superior status as well as the manifold practical advantages derived from having its language 
imposed upon other players. Furthermore, it also creates a different discursive context: to 
engage dialogue in more than one language gives participants a ‗larger toolbox‘ of expressive 
resources, if one will, to draw from when attempting to articulate concepts which transcend 
words.
61
 Thus, the question is not of ensuring equality between two or more languages, but 
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rather, about being able to articulate a given concept in any language.
62
 This method of 
linguistic interaction can only be of benefit in an internationalised setting.
63
 
These, amongst other reasons, have grounded the fears of scholars with regard to the 
recent dominance of the English language within international circles.
64
 This political trend 
has legal repercussions: it requires a re-casting of international discourse in the language of 
only one civilisation. Although cultural diversity is certainly important in itself, the focus of 
this study hinges on the legal and intellectual ramifications of unilingualism. The best 
guarantor of this diversity, at least from the adjudicatory perspective, is the continued 
multilingualism of international institutions.  
It is indisputable that legal norms, especially as expressed in written texts, depend not 
only on the text itself but also on those who are entrusted with its interpretation. Furthermore, 
having several authentic versions of documents, all equally accessible and validly so, allows 
for rules and legal norms of law to be legitimately separated from its material support, 
namely, the text, the words, and the form. Concepts can continue to emerge from the 
imperfect vocabulary of language:  
[L]‘expression la plus complète de la norme passé par la combinaison des versions, par les 
possibilités distinctes qu‘offrent les particularités et richesses métaphoriques de chaque 
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(Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2003), esp 188 et seq. 
langue, ou même par la création de néologismes qui émergent du passage d‘une langue à 
l‘autre.65  
It is for this reason that multilingualism acquires a legal character and should in this sense be 
preserved, with the ancillary effect of promoting cultural diversity and the input of diverse 
groups into the continued development of international law. 
Legal language is not immune from these phenomena; furthermore, international legal 
language, dependent as it is on the contact not only between individuals but between 
societies, rests on the intersection between these processes:  
[L]e langage technique du droit n‘est pas arrivé à un degré d‘abstraction et de formalisation 
comparable à celui des mathématiques. Il conserve des liens étroits avec la langue courante et 
participe, dans une large mesure, à l‘ambiguïté de celle-ci. Par ailleurs, le caractère normatif 
du droit s‘adapte mal à la logique formelle et au calcul logique, conçus plutôt pour des 




It is thus axiomatic that a living language brings with it the connotations and meanings 
ascribed to it by its native speakers, many of which are not explicit to the non-native speaker 
but are a part of its interpretation. In many respects, words and sentences lead one to 
‗connotations‘ of words, which can be understood as intellectual or affective references, 
extra-notional associations evoked or coloured by the words used.
67
 This is where the 
importance of interpretation, and in particular multilingual interpretation, becomes evident, as 
the role of the techniques of exegesis or interpretation rests precisely in ‗dissipating the myths 
which colour our language‘, and to ‗make audible the silences which all speech and language 
brings forth.‘68 Interpretation, the act of will by which interpreters impose themselves upon 
their word, is the culmination of what MacDonald calls a ‗tri-lectic‘ between author, text, and 
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reader,
69
 and each interpretive act commits interpreters to a future judgment shaped by past 
understanding, in so far as it is normative, going far beyond the very limited tri-lectic in 
question. 
 What is indeed important throughout this interpretive process is the status of the 
interpreter, whether it is a specialised, administrative agency, or a body with objective, 
general jurisdiction called upon to interpret. The importance of courts and their particular 
interpretive process is explained by Paul Reuter as follows:  
[O]n a parfois estimé que les cours de justice s‘arrêtaient volontiers à des interprétations 
littérales, stabilisant le sens des mots au contenu qu‘ils pouvaient avoir au moment de 
l‘établissement des règles, retirant finalement aux termes à interpréter toute pertinence, 
puisque ceux-ci pour la conserver auraient dû suivre l‘évolution des faits et de la science.70  
The potential audience for international texts goes far beyond the restricted group of judges, 
lawyers, and legislators in national settings, and bears with it a much more cogent 
‗universalist‘ pretension than the audience for national legal texts. 
 Furthermore, it is misplaced to speak of ‗clear texts‘: legal language, like all language, 
is laden with ambiguity, obscurity and indeterminacy. All these connotations of natural 
language continue to apply in legal settings, and therefore, any attempt at interpretation must 
consider all of these factors. It is one thing to interpret law; it is quite another to proceed with 
its application.
71
 Moreover, as Georges Scelle argued, interpretation is inherent in legal 
thought and cannot be discarded even when a text is ‗clear‘: 
Il ne faut pas confondre l‘interprétation de la règle de droit avec son application. Les deux 
opérations qui paraissent parfois se confondre en pratique, se succèdent et restent logiquement 
distinctes. Pour appliquer une règle de droit, il faut d’abord en déterminer la portée. Il n’y a 
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One can even make the argument that arbitrariness, incoherence and innate indeterminacy of 
language ‗fatally infects legal discourse‘,73 leading to formal statements of law posing as 
objective norms, confusing language and meaning as one, and assisting in the 
instrumentalisation of law as a coercive construct.
74
 Max Weber‘s aspiration of discourse as 
being reducible to ‗formal rationality‘ and a possible authoritative standard for (Western) law 




[S]i d‘un côté la langue exprime l‘identité d‘un système juridique dans les relations 




The importance of multilingualism in international law does not rest on maintaining cultural 
diversity, but rather, on the importance of accommodating legal pluralism within 
international legal discourse. There is far more at stake than cultural diversity and identity 
politics in ensuring that international law remains international. Besides the ‗loss of 
creativity in public international law … of approaches emanating from national legal orders 
to address legal problems‘,77 there must be limitations on the continued moulding of 
international law to fit the vision of one particular legal order or group of legal orders. There 
is an indissoluble link between language and thought which makes consolidation into two 
languages poor, and one language a disastrous leap.  
On a theoretical level, the form and substance inherent in understanding reality are 
lost by moving to one language. Understanding law through different languages and having 
them relate and interface with each other allows for diversity, be it cultural, intellectual or 
otherwise, to thrive. By perceiving international law through different languages and having 
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its interpretation occur in a multilingual context, one can perhaps better grasp the multiplicity 
of understandings that are lost in a uniformised linguistic setting.
78
 In a system with the 
limited heritage but universalist pretensions of international law, these questions acquire 
heightened importance and consideration; and the multilingual prism, which avoids the 
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